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ABSTRACT

This document contains four papers about the ideological structure of personality. A proposal for a theoretical and methodological reworking of the life-historical inquiry of personality psychology is presented along with a report of some preliminary studies that employ an intensive life-history approach to a distinct topic within the context of personality structure and form a series of independent but conceptually related research efforts. The introductory paper provides theoretical comments and an overview. Work on the refraction of power relations within the "my" themes of self-representation is presented in the second paper, based on an analysis of one woman's life-history narrative. The next paper uses material from an interview with one man to outline a thesis on self-representation commonly implicated in the processes of making major life decisions. The final paper examines the constraints to rationality in the development of democratic attitudes, as demonstrated by interviews with an auto worker concerning his attitudes toward proposals for workplace democratization. The set of papers argues that the study of personality functions is necessarily the study of ideological processes that requires explicit, systematic, and critical confrontation in order to be scientific. (Author/NRB)

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Critical Studies on the Ideological Structure of Personality

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Critical Studies on the Ideological Structure of Personality

Introductory Comments.[1]

These papers comprise both a proposal for a theoretical and methodological reworking of the tradition of life-historical inquiry within the field of personality psychology, and a report of some preliminary studies undertaken in this vein. These studies, conducted over the past four years by a group of investigators at the University of Michigan, each employ an intensive life-history approach to a distinct topic and form a series of independent but conceptually related researches. They share a common fundamental question, concerning the ideological functions of "personality", or "subjectivity", which is conceived as an individualized system of self- and other-representations. Thus, the question under investigation is the relationship between the formation of "personality", in its cognitive, motivational, and symbolic aspects, and the manner in which the institutions and material conditions of the social order are perpetuated.

As the erstwhile "senior" investigator, I shall not present my current research project -- which is part of this ensemble, and is an examination of the psychodynamic conditions and ideological functions of religious conversion experiences. Instead, some theoretical comments will be offered, by way of introduction to three substantive and topic-oriented papers by Gregg, Sloan, and Earnest.

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[1]By Barnaby B. Barratt. An earlier version of these papers was presented as a symposium at the 89th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association in Los Angeles, on August 26th, 1981. We would like to thank Professor Norma G. Haan of the University of California at Berkeley, for her generous comments and criticisms.

What are the distinctive features of this research ensemble? In what ways is this work critical of the predominant modes of investigation in personality and social psychology? And why are the questions asked by this research, as well as the methods by which they are asked, important?

While diverging on several significant points of theory and method, our studies converge upon certain radical propositions concerning the implications of ideological discourse in the formation of subjective experience, as determined by the structures of psychic representation; and hence concerning the way in which lives are to be interpreted scientifically. Through separate, multiple-case depth interview investigations, these studies attempt, in various ways, to establish a reconfrontation with the traditional problem of "individual and society" or "personality and culture". "Personality", as has been said, is broadly conceived here as an individualized system of self- and other- representations, and "culture"; as will be explained, is conceived as an ideologically-bounded semiological system that constrains and conditions representational possibility, and that is anchored to the socioeconomic structuring of public life.

We view these studies as a scientific radicalization of the sort of work done a number of years ago by Theodor Adorno, Robert White, and Brewster Smith. We argue for a mode of case-oriented research, that is founded in a critical theory issuing from the writings of the so-called Frankfurt School, and that employs concepts derived from recent developments in semiological theory with its roots in linguistics, psychoanalysis, and structural anthropology.

It is appropriate to describe this work as interpretative, or <u>semiological</u> -- following Roland Barthes. And as <u>critical</u> -- following the Frankfurt School. It is semiological in that it analyzes[3] systems of

signification, meaning or representation. We will typically refer to institutional or individual systems of self- and other-representations, and to "personality" in terms of the subject's representational world. The research is critical in three major ways. (1) It starts with an epistemological and methodological critique of paradigmatically dominant approaches to the study of sociopsychological questions. And in the papers that follow, some of this is indicated, when inadequacies of cognitive-behavioral, trait, and survey research, are mentioned. (2) It argues against the tendency to divorce study of the interiority of "personality" from study of the exteriority of sociocultural conditions and structures. Instead, the mediations between intrapsychic, interpersonal, institutional, societal and historical processes are emphasized. By "mediations", we mean not simple linkages, but the manner in which processes at one level represent, misrepresent, and reconcile conflicts or contradictions arising at another level. (3) It attempts to fulfill the demystifying intent of any truly scientific inquiry, and in terms of studies of the human psyche in general, and of the ideology of ideation and individuation in particular, this necessitates a dialectical interrogation to demonstrate not only that which data reveal by that which they serve to conceal. Hopefully, this notion will be exemplified in the papers that follow.

Summarily, while different in several respects, these studies share a twofold impetus: (1) to investigate the interiority of personal meaning via an interrogation of the subject aimed at reconstruction of the internal relations and transformations of the individual's representational and significational activity; and (2) to examine the relationship between this interiority and "culture" as a system of meanings by which reality is

represented, and by which the materiality of the socioeconomic order is produced and reproduced.

To put it a little more simply, the focus must not only be on "personality" as the way in which the individual understands the world, but also on "ideology" as the semiologically transmitted constraints to such understanding, that serve to contain the contradictions and conflicts of the social order, and hence to produce and reproduce this order.

In this light, there are several important ways in which we have to break with more traditional and orthodox lines of personality research, two of which are as follows. (1) Personality cannot be treated externalistically. Commonly, personality psychologists, in accordance with the form dictated by empiricist assessment techniques, by the pragmatic tradition of individual differences research, and by the epistemological presumptions of so-called "cognitive behaviorism", have defined personality externalistically as a bundle of algebraically related trait dimensions, as a hierarchy of values or needs, and so forth. Here we shift to an interrogation of the interior representation of reality. (2) Personality, as an interior system of self- and other-representation, cannot be treated decontextually. Commonly, personality psychologists, in accordance with reductionistic tendencies that pervade the discipline, have examined their subject matter as an autochthonous reality. Here we shift towards a demonstration of the mediations between intrapsychic and sociocultural phenomena, and hence of the ideological significance of the individual's representational world.

The reality in which we live is, of course, the reality of our representations. It is both an idiographic and a shared reality. It is "shared" inasmuch as individual existence is historically determined by material conditions experienced collectively, and inasmuch as this sociality

operates through a communal system of representations by which the horizons of nature, of history, of social action, and of our selves, are construed. It is "idiographic" inasmuch as the individual life-historical passage is a working and reworking of self- and other-representations within a unique configuration of relationships. And, following Freud, we must acknowledge that this intrapsychic topography has a certain historicity and self-opacity. Subjectivity, in this view, is both a potentiality and a positionality -- project and product. The individual is, at one and the same time, both subject within and subjected to the semiological system that defines and delimits the possibilities of representational construction. The individual life-history can be thematized as the struggle of desire to challenge, subvert, or negate such authority, while the latter, epitomized by the "false obviousness of everyday life", conditions and contains desire. Within a given sociocultural context -- for example, feudal society in 13th Century France, or state-monopoly capitalism in late 20th Century U.S.A. -- a specifiable semiology thus defines and delimits the individual's horizons of understanding. The individual's subjectivity is thereby constituted as a subject for the social order, determining its production and reproduction; while simultaneously this subjectivity provides the grounds for a reflective movement towards a more meaningful individuation.

The ideological quality of an individual's system of self- and other-representations involves the maintenance and management of the sociocultural infrastructure ideationally. When we refer to "ideology" in these studies, we do not mean anything as straightforward as the individual's manifest political beliefs, nor the individual's active partisanship and participation in social movements. We are not so much concerned with the representation <u>of</u> class, race, or gender; and we are not necessarily implying a

"totalitarian" relationship between individual and social order. Rather, the notion of ideology that is advanced here is pervasively and complexly implicated in the most fundamental semiological processes of personality formation. It addresses the ways in which, particularly in nominally "free" societies such as our own, individuals, through the constitution of their representational world, come to accept as "obvious fact" understandings of themselves and others, that render potentially resolvable conflicts and contradictions on the institutional level unrecognizable. The ideological functioning of personality formation involves not only so-called axiological knowledge of moral, cultural, and practical affairs, but epistemic relations in general: it is a replication of the law, but also of the thinking, concrete and imaginary, of the social order, and the constitution of subjectivity within and for that order. In these studies, we set out to uncover ideology on two levels:

(1) In the content of the subject's representations, even the most ostensibly mundane representations. And we discover the extent to which the representational world is organized and articulated around certain key relations, that may rudimentarily be conceived as internalizations and identifications necessary to the material reproduction of the social order.

(2) In constraints upon the subject's capacity for reflection upon these representations. And we discover the extent to which the subject's movement towards the genuine autonomy of thought, a potentially emancipatory and transformative social praxis, may be arrested by unrecognized, coercive dimensions of the semiological system.

The presentations that follow include vignettes and analyses based upon the interviewing of three persons. Gregg will discuss his work on the refraction of power relations within the mythemes of self-representation;

and this paper is based on an analysis of a woman named "Faith". Using material from interviews with a man named "Bill", Sloan will outline his thesis on self-misrepresentations commonly implicated in the processes of making major life decisions. And Earnest will examine constraints to rationality in the development of democratic attitudes, as demonstrated by interviews with an autoworker named "Pat" concerning his attitudes towards proposals for workplace democratization. A very complex and ambitious program of research will thus be depicted via three abbreviated samplings. Despite certain differences, these papers argue the study of personality functions is necessarily the study of ideological processes, and hence to be scientific requires that this be confronted explicitly, systematically, and hence critically. This ensemble thus aims at a serious critique of several contemporary lines of personality research, and also argues for a particular critical and semiological approach to the phenomena of life-history, as well as introducing the notion of ideology as it relates to the study of individuals. All this is intended to establish a scientific inquiry upon the processes by which the representations of subjectivity produce and reproduce the social order in all its manifestations.

Culture, Personality and Power Relationships[2]

In this paper, a "symbolic" or "structural" analysis of a life-history narrative will be presented. My approach can be characterized, in part, by Saussure's distinction between la langue and la parole, or what will be called linguistic structure and speech acts. The study of linguistic structure

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[2]Written by Gary Gregg.

includes semantics and syntax: the system of meaningful distinctions set up by differences between words, and the rules for combining words into meaningful sentences. The study of speech acts primarily concerns the learning of language and uttering of statements investigating the stimulus conditions or cognitive states that predict the occurrence of specific word chains.

Psychologists typically study power and personality--when they do at all--in the context of a causal model linking social factors, childrearing practices and personality "traits." They treat personality as an ensemble of speech-act-like behaviors, and search for social factors that predict significant differences in their distribution. I do not see this strategy as inherently flawed, and I do not advocate structural analysis as a remedy. But the causal approach has almost inevitably erred by focusing on "healthy" or "valued" traits exhibited by an advantaged group, and documenting deficiencies in a disadvantaged group. Its questionable success has been to generate some interesting hypotheses about why the natives are not only restless, but don't speak too good.

Symbolic or structural analysis approaches personality as akin to a linguistic structure, and seeks to identify the semantic and syntactical rules which organize it. It regards symbols, metaphors and myths as the primary "building blocks" of the Self, in contrast to the "schemata" now popular in so-called "cognitive social psychology." Structural analysis does not enable us to predict an individual's behavior, but to learn what their behaviors <u>mean</u>. In this regard, it enables us to see how macrosocial power relations come to permeate the infrastructure of the Self, and hence how personality is not just <u>linked</u> to ideology, but itself <u>becomes</u> ideological.

A few observations from an analysis of a life-narrative by a woman I will call "Faith" will now be presented. I will unfortunately have to leave aside important dimensions of her story that constitute a rather searching discourse on how to be a woman in a world controlled by men. Her life-narrative consists of twelve hours of taped interviews, and the analysis treats this material as if it were a mythological system, to some extent after the fashion of Levi-Strauss in The Raw and the Cooked, or Victor Turner's work on Ndembu ritual. I've broken it into eleven "story cycles," containing 133 stories, and identified the most prominent affective states, conceptual distinctions and symbolic elements in each story. Her "Self" is taken to consist not just of the elements about which she makes the attribution "this is me," but the system of relations that obtain between those elements and others which are set up as "not me." Without these negative contrasts, the elements endorsed as "Self" would have no meaning. The "Self" thus resides in the structural contrasts which define the "me"/"not me" system.

"Faith" is 30 years old and single. She works as a sales manager for a computer software firm, drives a Porsche and owns a restored older home with polished oak antiques in an elm-lined historical district near Detroit. She has a warm, outgoing, high-energy personal presence that draws attention in any gathering of people. She is painfully aware that she does not always "pull off" all that she aspires to be, but on the whole she does quite well at it. And she has high aspirations. "I want it all," she says, "I want to be good at something, I want to be exceptional, not mediocre, exceptional". She says this desire comes "from never being anything special, to anyone or anything," and adds that she's driven by fear, not competition: "a fear of being poor, fear of being fat and ugly, fear of anything." And when asked what she realistically expects to accomplish, she

laughs and says, "an early death," and then turns serious: "Realistically? All those things, baby, every fucking one--fast, now, tomorrow" Here is the first half of her first "story":

> I grew up on the East Side of Philadelphia, lower income level, six kids in the family, first generation Italian. My mom was a homemaker, 'cause it was disgraceful for a woman to work, and my dad worked in a factory. I'm the only one to get a higher education, and I think most of my motivation came from wanting to get out, to do something different. I really didn't think I could do it, I didn't think I was good enough. I didn't get any support from the folks, and to prove them wrong I did it, you know? They didn't think that women belonged in school, and they didn't think I was real smart. Of course, I'm like the dark horse in the family, I'm the only one who bucked a lot of rules and pointed out the inconsistencies of their child training.

Here is her second story:

> "You know how some girls at 14 or 15 begin to date and guys call them up? Well, I never went through that, mainly because I'm a tall girl--I was like 5'10" in the eighth grade. I'm glad for it, 'cause it helped me learn a lot about interpersonal relationships between men and women as opposed to the boy/girl thing in dating. But I also felt like I was left out, that I wasn't pretty enough, or enough of a female. And to this day, I have a hard time dealing with that, I always feel like I'm not sexy enough or not attractive or too masculine. Then I went to high school, and it was like, "Oh, my God," it was wonderful. I got into cheerleading, president of the student council, editor of the school newspaper and yearbook. That's when I really started making some changes. There were a couple of gentlemen in my life, just friends kind

of people, who were older, and they saw me as a diamond in the rough, and they kind of cleaned me up a bit. If it weren't for them, I probably wouldn't be where I am at today. They made me feel important. And a couple of teachers said, hey man, you're better than this--why don't you go to college?

These stories introduce two key metaphors: that she is a "dark horse, bucking," and "a diamond in the rough." They are key metaphors because they crystallize nearly all of the important themes developed in the following stories. That they are "key" does not mean they are irreplaceable, as Faith could equally well use others to embody the same threads of meaning. As they stand, they are the main entrances into the semiotic structure of her "Self," the nodal points at which all paths cross.

Faith's story is part Horatio Alger: the dark horse bucking is the self-made woman who left for college with her father grumbling that she'd just "get pregnant and flunk out." She tells many stories embodying themes of rebellion against irrational and unjust restraints. The metaphor resonates again and again as she tells how she's not "chained" to a "sterile" lifestyle like her older sister, describes her most serious struggles as being "saddled," and proudly proclaims that she's earned the right to "hold her head high." Faith's story is also part Pygmalion: as a "diamond in the rough," she was discovered and "cleaned up" by two older "gentlemen." This metaphor resonates even more extensively. She leaves no doubt that the "rough" represents her home, her neighborhood, her class and her ethnicity. She portrays her home as a site of choas, crudity and violence, describing it as a "shithole." She portrays her father as a "crude," "gruff" "bully," who repeatedly embarrassed her, and after one series of stories about him adds,

"nice home for a little girl to be brought up in." She portrays her mother as well-intentioned but ignorant and long-suffering, and says hypothetically to her, "ma, don't worry. I don't need anybody to pull me out of the sewer, I can do it myself."

The "rough" represents the poverty of always "making do," of not seeing doctors when she needed. It represents the ignorance and brutality of "dumb Dagos" who in vivid memories she recalls butchering sheep, beating her up and treating each other's feelings with callous disregard. Her earliest memory consists of a "Bread and Chocolate" image of herself and a blond neighbor girl reaching through a fence to touch each other's hair. Later she recalls angrily the time her mother cut her hair short, starting to say, "all my golden locks," but catching herself mid-way through "golden," and changing it to "dark, curly." The diamond is bright, sparkling and white; the rough dirty and black. The "dark horse" image already suggests a movement from the "black sheep" saying that would have been appropriate to the context--a movement toward whiteness in color, and from "sheep," the helpless animal her "dumb Dago" cousin slaughtered, to a horse which comes from the back of the pack and bucks for its freedom. And she often employs a parallel metaphor to describe the aspirations her gentlemen discovers inspired in her: "shooting for the stars," another image of sparkling white against a black background, and high above the "earth."

Her life narrative is <u>about</u> moving from rough to diamond, about transforming shit into gemstone. She talks at length about her own transformation, struggling to learn the social graces of the white middle class "fairy tale" world she caught glimpses of in the homes of friends. She recalls at length the story of Queenie, the nearly-dead neglected dog her father saved from a cruel owner, which her family nurtured into the

best pet they ever had. And she tells twice and with relish one of her most salient early memories: of gathering rocks from an alley, washing and covering them with vaseline, in hopes of selling them as "precious stones." In human, animal and mineral kingdoms, then, she sets up parallel allegories of shit being alchemically transformed into diamonds, of waste into things of value.

So Faith is diamond and not rough. She is a "progressive woman," not an "old-world Dego-mama." She's "shooting for the stars," not sitting at home like her "lazy" younger sister, not locked in the ghetto like sexually-aggressive con-artist "nigger" "bucks" and "sluts," nor languishing in the poverty that will "always be with us" because of the skid row "white trash" who live the "easy" life of drinking and making babies.

But then both of these central metaphors invert, and Faith becomes herself "rough." At times this occurs involuntarily. When things go badly, she slips into feeling like "the ugly girl who doesn't have a date for the prom," and by contrast to her "blond, blue-eyed, Adonis-like" boyfriend, feels "not pretty, too tall, too fat, and not good enough." She describes these periods of doubt and anguish as "feeling worthless," the antithesis of a precious gem. Her horse metaphor is built on a perfectly apt ambiguity in this regard, for horses can be either beautiful, proud and prancing, or big, awkward and ungainly. When she describes how <u>she</u> sometimes feels big, awkward and out of place, she says she "doesn't want to be seen as a dark horse."

And from this stance she begins to identify with the plight of blacks, the poor and women who have been unable to pull themselves up as she has. Referring to the social movements she disdains because they are "emotional" rather than "civil," she adds, "I saw a lot of myself in the Black pleas--being stuck in the city, not thinking a lot of myself, being ostracized,

lacking cultural stimulation that others had. It's interesting, because I always resorted to music and dance and partying and jiving, and I still do."

And she does--she not only falls into feeling still "rough" on occasion, but draws on her street mannerisms and plays them to the hilt. She often adopts a "Fonzie," "hard-guy" style, has quite a reputation for her quick and "foul mouth," and repeatedly portrays herself as a "wild, crazy woman." She finds the artificiality of the middle class world she now moves in "as scummy as poverty," and in contrast to this rhinestone reality of "facades," "phonies," "put-ons," and "back-stabbers," she plays "rough."

The class distinctions which delineate the infrastructure of Faith's "Self" thus ultimately have to do with styles of impulse expression. This appears most clearly in the story she tells to the first TAT card, which protrays a boy, chin on palms, looking at a violin: "The kid's a clean-cut kid. He probably came from an upper-middle class family. The mother wanted him to become a great concert violinist, and she buys him this violin, he's got the music in front of him. The parents are probably really excited about him doing this number here, they got him private lessons, forget about the school lessons, we'll get him private lessons. The kid don't want to play the violin, he wants the drums. So he's sittin' here with this violin, he's not very happy, and he's thinking I wonder what you can do to the violin to make it a lot more snazzy, you can't beat on it. The outcome? There could be two. One, he could turn into a dynamite fiddler in a high caliber country-western band. Or he breaks it, tells his mother it just broke."

Here we can see the personological meaning of class in Faith's ambivalence over two expressive styles, represented as an opposition of the "classical" violin and "folk" drums. And we see her seek a compromise

in the notion of a "high caliber" country-western fiddler.

This contrast and inversion appears vividly in a story she tells about visiting a college boyfriend's home for the first time: "We're driving. We get to his little suburb. Big stone wall with huge wrought iron, I'd never seen anything like that. There was a guy at the gate to let him in. What is this, a joke? I mean, I feel like a slob. We pull in, I'm talking like golf course yard, O.K.? My heart is in my throat, I'm petrified. His parents are at the door and his dad is smoking a pipe and his mother pecks him on the cheek, and the little sisters say Hi, and the little dog--it was just like Ozzie and Harriet. I felt like, Oh, no, can they see me? I mean, can they, can they see through me? They're looking and thinking, she's Italian, she's low class. But I maintained...And after that I decided I just wasn't good enough for him, I mean, I just wasn't the kind of woman he would be happy with. I was just an exciting thing for him, I was like a wild, crazy woman. I was just earth, I was like right there. I just laid things out, no games, up-front, and he dug it. It excited him, but the guy really deep down inside would want someone to be just like his mama, be just like his daddy. I didn't want that for me. It looked good, but I didn't want it. After that you could see the silver spoon--it was always sticking out of his mouth, you know?"

The ideological inversion can be seen clearly here, in the movement from low class and Italian to up-front and earthy. And it can take yet another form, as an immanent but undeveloped critique of the entire structure. Not only does "shooting for the stars" transform shit into gems, but it generates dangerous and potentially lethal wastes as a byproduct. Personally, she blames the driveness of her striving for producing the bodily "poisons"

that cause her recurant ulcer. Socially, she has strong feelings about one political issue: "fucking, goddamn nuclear power," and in particular, "contamination by nuclear waste." She says, "You can't fucking escape it, that's the scariest thing, you have no power! You're so little, you know? Fucking power companies and chemical companies just polluting, just pouring out fucking waste and you're drinking it, you're living in it. I don't even want to think about it." How did we get into this mess? "Technology, always striving, it's the competitive spirit, competition. Somebody always trying to make something bigger and better and cheaper. Money, money, money! That's how we got into it".

We see Faith's "Self" structured around two key metaphors: "a diamond in the rough," and "a dark horse, bucking." These define a fundamental split: she is diamond, not rough; a proud bucking stallion, not a helpless victimized sheep. This split underlies a dominant ideology which organizes her quest for power, a quest in which economic and psychological "worth" fuse into a driven, star-bound trajectory. But the split also engenders an inverted ideology: she is earthy, not plastic; authentic, not phony. This inversion is not a straightforward commutation that produces a mirror image, but akin to the inversion of a musical chord which maintains the tonal structure, but changes the harmonic.

Though it carries an implicit critique, the "wild" and "earthy" inversion is largely contained within the dominant ideology, drawn into its service as a counterpuntal source of power. It's essentially a modern version of the primitive powers typically attributed by colonists to uncolonized jungle peoples on the basis of their priveleged resonance with the rhythms of nature--and then seized upon by the uncolonized as a way of intimidating frightened colonists. In other words, she's affirmed

part of the middle class stereotype of working class closeness to nature, and forged it into a strategic style she employs in middle class settings. We thus see Faith's "Self" split by an opposition of Nature and Culture, which in her case primarily means social class, and secondarily, ethnicity. These social divisions of power form the semiotic infrastructure of her "Self." The structure consists of a set of transformational rules that "alchemically" separate earth from shit, turns shit into diamonds, diamonds into plastic and plastic into radioactive and biological waste.

These metaphorical transformations differentiate and orchestrate her emotional life by shifting control of affect states, at critical junctures, from one symbolic discourse to another, from a mythical cycle about climbing out of the rough to one about playing "rough" in the company of phonies. At points she's painfully aware of the tragic contradiction lying at the heart of this class-linked psychological structure. "My poor dad," she says, "why couldn't he have gotten some of the breaks I did? Why couldn't the world have been different when he was growing up? I think about how hard he works to make a dollar, and how hard I work to make the same dollar, and I don't feel right....But on the other hand, I say goddamn, God bless me, fuckin' hey, I did it".

In mobilizing her "Self" to "do it," she has integrated her two styles of impulse expression into a kind of characterological score, which turns the tragic inequalities of class into an enchanting and strategically useful aesthetic tension. The urgency of battle isolates her perception of that tragedy, and limits her critique of striving to an unintegrated fear of nuclear comtamination. It further consigns to silence and even derision, personal qualities shared with the poor and disadvantaged which she

perceives as lacking strategic value.

Though the specific symbols, metaphors and transformations discussed here are idiosyncratic to Faith's narrative, the class-linked, dominant/inverted ideological structure emerges at the heart of most of the other life-narratives we have collected. It appears in a significantly different form, however, for those who reside on the working class side of the chasm, and orient their narratives around the primary personal methaphor of being a "factory rat." To draw another analogy from the anthropology of colonization: The colonists define themselves within a cosmology in which they oppose themselves to jungle dwellers; the jungle dwellers define themselves within a cosmology in which they oppose themselves to colonists. The two cosmologies share many features--including the power of prayer and sorcery; they have a common "deep structure," and constitute a shared cultural framework. But to be colonist and <u>not</u> jungle dweller, differs profoundly from being jungle dweller and <u>not</u> colonist. In other words, these differences do not just separate colonists from jungle dwellers, but define symbolic oppositions that split and organize the "Self" of every person who comes of age in that cultural framework. Such, in the interior of Selfhood, is the fashion in which social class has become all-pervasive in the modern world, in spite of its perhaps declining power to predict social mobility or the distribution of certain personality "traits."

The final point is very simple: the "self" resides quite literally in the world; the world quite literally in the "self." And the axes which divide people from each other by relations of exploitation--whether caste, class, race, gender or intelligence--define the axes along which people semiotically split the interior of their personalities, excommunicating

as alien, and fearing or hating in others, much that they might make peace with in themselves.

False Consciousness in Major Life Decisions[3]

The term false consciousness, which has had a diverse usage in Marxist and Existentialist literatures, refers here to socially-produced self- and other-misrepresentations and related character structures which sustain individual activity in the interests of the reproductive requirements of the social order. In my attempts to understand major life decisions from a broader perspective than that afforded by the psychological laboratory or survey/inventory techniques, this concept became necessary. Most subjects are limited in their capacity to reflect upon the social and life-historical dimensions of important decisions. Such constraints on self-reflection must be adequately conceptualized for a comprehensive understanding of decision-making processes. On the basis of my life-historical research on major life decisions, several related aspects of false consciousness can be described:

1) ideological characteristics of predominant approaches to the psychology of decision making,
2) types of rationalization which underlie false consciousness in major life decisions,
3) the manner in which false consciousness subverts recognition of one's primary interests in decision processes, and,
4) our collective misunderstanding of the nature of "personal dilemmas."

A survey of the psychological literature on decision making reveals a

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[3]Written by Tod S. Sloan

tendency which has peculiar implications for the conduct of life. It is assumed that the positivistic logic of the physical sciences, which makes possible the technical control of nature, is appropriate to the task of understanding "inner nature" as well. Technical rationality may lead to impressive results in the development of industry and other complex institutions, but it must be questioned whether it is suited as a model for personal decisions and problem solving. The ethos of technical rationality is utilitarian -- it stresses efficiency, maximization of gain, minimization of risk, and fixed behavioral sequences ("procedures") which guarantee effectiveness. Research on the psychology of decision making has been so charmed by models based on this ethos that it short-circuits the possibility of considering individual dilemmas in their uniquely personal and implicitly societal aspects. Technical rationality may secretly sustain "irrationality" while pretending to minimize it.

We may initially characterize a decision as a conscious resolution to carry out a project. When we speak of a "major life decision", it is typically implied that the involvements and activities of the individual will be altered substantially, the spheres of the "life structure" will undergo transformation. A major life decision always involves a rearrangement of the social field in which the individual is embedded. Without exception, such decisions involve changes in meaningful involvements with other human figures -- if not directly, at an imaginary, unconscious level. This intersubjectivity of deciding is ignored in rationalistic models of decision making.

That perspective, particularly dominant in cognitive social psychology and "cognitive-behavioral" syntheses, suggests roughly the following:

> Decisions should be made rationally -- that is, they should involve a process of reasoning in confrontation with "reality." Since important decisions involve risk, stress and emotionality (which are usually assumed a priori to weaken or contaminate the reasoning process) interfere with the ideal of rationality. Adequate information processing is likely to be displaced by impulsive, premature resolution of a dilemma or endless deliberation. To minimize the adverse effects of emotional disturbance or stress, a stance of "vigilance" is recommended. This involves a sequence of conscientiously executed cognitive steps. First, the problem needs to be conceptualized in order to know what it is that actually needs to be decided. Then, the various solutions should be surveyed and options should be searched out. These alternatives are to be evaluated in terms of risks or probabilities of success and failure. On the basis of this process, a response to the problem may be selected which is likely to effect a solution.

At first reading, this approach seems compelling. This is merely a personalized version of the "scientific" mode of problem solving. As we are inclined by reason of culture to try to be logical, we might eagerly adopt such a method to organize our confusion in times of deliberation. Yet, one can take issue with the model for seeking to serve as a guideline for effective decision making. Guidelines and mini-ethics can always be twisted to serve the ends of any determined intention. This leads us to a more serious problem of the model -- its failure to acknowledge and contend with the defensive tendency to rationalize. While pretending to induce a clearer view of the reality in which one is deciding, it actually obfuscates the matter by severing the individual from the historical,

social, and unconscious roots of the dilemma. This move further decenters the subject and creates the gap which rationalization aims to conceal.

Three senses of the term "rationalization" are employed here. The first is the Freudian concept, the justification of an action on grounds other than its primary determinants. This type of rationalization can be occasioned by the anxiety aroused as an unacceptable intention seeks acknowledgment and expression. In this case, decisions may be made compulsively "on the back of" rationalizations which cover the return of repressed desire in a scenically familiar situation. The dynamics of the repetition compulsion sustain all such "stereotyped" deciding.

The second aspect of rationalization comes into play at the point where the rationale sought to justify an action is picked from among the clichés, excuses, and disclaimers which generally pass unchallenged in social discourse. Social endorsement thus facilitates the expression of unacknowledged private intentions, usually in a direction which serves to affirm the existing social order.

In the third case, the Weberian concept of rationalization subsumes the extension of scientific rationality to the conduct of life itself, including the mathematization of experience (assigning weights to personal goals or valves, for example) and means-ends rationality (precise calculation of the means to attain definite practical ends, of the sort which reaches the point of absurdity in magazine quizzes on "How to know when you've met Mr. Right"). Originally such processes were adopted in administrative-executive circles, but are now frequently relied upon in the "administration" of the life course by subjects themselves, under the guise of "life planning", "goal setting," "values clarification," and so forth. This type of rationalization actually calls into play a number of related

defensive measures -- including intellectualization, denial, undoing, isolation, and projection.

Deliberation following means-ends rationality rarely questions whether the ends sought are desirable. Questions like, "Does this decision have to be made now? By me?", and "Am I really trying to solve some problem other than the one related to this decision?" are sidestepped in rationalistic models. Simultaneously, the institutions and practices prevalent in society have undergone "rationalization" (e.g., highly bureaucratized division of labor, mechanization of production, external assessment of individual performance) to the point that individuals see the social order as "natural" and quickly assume they are at fault if their needs are not met within that framework.

These abstractions need fleshing out. In order to relate false consciousness to the emergence of a decision in a social context and within a life structure, a series of interviews with a man called "Bill" is summarized here.

Bill lives in a middle-class suburb of Cincinatti with his wife and three children. He has a long commute to work where he demonstrates computer systems to prospective customers. Bill knows none of his co-workers on a personal basis, even though he has been at the firm for two years. He says his work performance is satisfactory, but not energetic. In fact, he leaves work as early as he can to be with his family. In the evening, he plays with his kids and other neighborhood children, watches TV, and converses with his wife about the day's doings. On weekends, he spends much of his time watching sports on TV, goes to church, and enjoys his family life.

Bill's involvements in these spheres is generally calm, quiet, and peaceful, yet every four or five days he loses his temper in a manner which

frightens him. He is never violent, but images of flashing fists come to his mind as he shouts at his wife or children. He considers his temper to be the aspect of his personality he would like most to change.

After a couple of interviews, Bill reported that he was due for an annual salary review at work. He said he was preparing to "really go in there and tell it to them like it is." By that, he meant that his financial situation was deteriorating in the face of inflation. He was having to cut back too many essential areas of his family's life style. He wanted to ask for a big raise and was willing to work in any sort of position in order to earn it. In a brave moment, Bill said he might threaten to leave the company if he did not hear a satisfactory response. He might also take on a part-time job in the Air Force Reserve. Eight years before, Bill had enlisted in the Air Force to avoid the draft, serving for six years as a navigator on intercontinental bombers. He liked flying a great deal, but missed his family while he was gone. He grudgingly took a big pay cut when he left the Air Force in order to be with his family more consistently.

The psychology of decision making typically picks up the decision problem at the point where it is already framed specifically. This is why it is easy to adopt a rationalistic model which ignores the subject's social embeddedness as well as his personal history. But, as yet, Bill is not thinking in terms of having to make a decision. He is merely formulating strategies to relieve financial problems. Since Bill has a hard time admitting that the issue is more directly related to a lack of fulfillment in his work, his decision will come to be framed as "Should I or should I not join the Reserves in order to earn more money?" This question fails to address his real problem and regardless of the answer will not quell his angry outbursts.

The annual salary review failed to proceed as Bill had hoped. He was informed that there were no openings for him in other departments and that raises had to be kept at a minimum because the company's profits had fallen off. He then told his supervisors that he might have to take on a part-time job with the Air Force in order to make ends meet. They only seemed concerned that he be around when he was needed.

As I probed for anger Bill might have felt during or after this incident, he quickly sided with his bosses. "They had to work within the company's salary guidelines." "Inflation hits everyone hard." "We all have to tighten our belts." He told me that he could always look for a job with another company if he needed the money badly enough. Bill hardly recognized that he had backed off almost immediately in the salary negotiation. While he feared being too pushy, it is likely that his passivity prevents his supervisors from considering him for the position in management to which Bill aspires.

It would take a long detour to explain the origins of Bill's passivity in a life historical perspective. This aspect of his personality can be seen as the result of experience within a matrix of social relations which compel him to be a peaceful and compromising person. It is in the retreat from confrontation that Bill's decision takes shape. He had applied to the Reserves "just to see" if they would take him back. They accepted him and awaited his decision. Experiencing his family at that point as a burden as much as a joy, the idea of soaring far above the troubles of the earth appealed to Bill. "And I sure do like to fly," he kept telling me as he pondered the issue.

To understand Bill's eventual decision to join the Reserves along the lines of the rationalistic model, or, worse, to try to use it as a guideline for a better decision, ignores the fact that Bill's representations of

himself and his world are not entirely his own to work with. To specify this, one could say that he is subjected to his desire to be a good father, a complex desire entailing role-images in conflict with each other. One image of a good father, for Bill, stresses appearances -- high salary, new car, big house, evenings at McDonalds with the kids, designer jeans for his 8 year-old. This image, instilled by the consumerist ideology of our economic order, comes to take precedence over that of the father who spends good times with his kids and is emotionally available to them. Both images play off unconscious intentions toward Bill's own father, whom he judges to have failed on both counts.

When Bill decided to spend more time away from the family, he had to suppress his primary intention to maintain the quality of his family life. The sociocultural context in which he lives and from which he draws his rationales endorses this move. Bill's status anxiety and characterological anxiety move him to a position where the social order has him contributing more firmly to its maintenance and literally to its "defense".

Rationalistic models are not structured to set up an awareness of this false consciousness, of the ideological core of personality functioning. The privatization of problems, the serialization of individuals, the fragmentation of neighborhoods and workplaces, prevent a collective supersession of the need to make self-wrenching decisions like Bill's. (He was certainly not unique among my interviewees in trying to find a way to make a living doing something he finds rewarding.)

False consciousness has two faces in the realm of major life decisions. In the first case, constraints are not recognized. The social framework for individual life is seen as a natural fact. It produces subjects who have

internalized its authority and whose decisions fall neatly into place, even if somewhat haphazardly. In the second case, domination is recognized, but the subject shies away from confrontation with complex structures, relationships, or institutions. Typically a compromise formation results: gratifications are guiltily sought in private, or the individual's social action is diverted into realms which are ineffective with regard to the social totality, e.g., sports, TV, communes, religiosity, hobbies.

In the case of Bill, we see that rationalization functions not only as a private defensive manoeuver. In fact, the characteristics of this constraint on subjectivity mark it as indelibly social in its character. False consciousness evades the social roots of personal dilemmas, leading subjects to struggle in isolation with problems which are actually collective.

Most decision problems are thus mini-struggles of social and historical import. Their texture reveals the twisted fabric of suppressed conflicts within the social order. To the extent that psychological methods and theories, as well as popular culture, ignore the processes of false consciousness, we are not likely to develop effective strategies for the solution of personal problems and public issues.

Ideological Constraints on Democratic Interests[4]

To elaborate the function of ideology in the maintenance of the social order, a modified version of the concept of "contradiction" is used here to refer to situations in which systems of self- and other-representations that are specific to particular primary institutions (for example, the family or the workplace) become effective within other social institutions. To

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[4]Written by W. Randolph Earnest

illustrate this, we can consider a specific contradiction of capitalist democracies, that between hierarchical social forms of the workplace, prototypically the factory, and more democratic-egalitarian social forms. Clearly, to the extent that subordinated workers interpret the regulations of the factory as a violation of status, rights, deserved forms of reciprocity, etc., that they have lived out in other sectors of the political sphere and elsewhere, the command structures of work will be threatened or at least rendered ineffective. Thus, this study explores the manner in which ideology operates to identify the sphere of work as one in which hierarchical relations are appropriate and/or necessary, thereby circumscribing democratic-egalitarian relations. It is suggested that this circumscription unfolds not simply as a discrete socialization process, to be conceptualized in essentially cognitive terms, but rather that the process of circumscription entails a subversion of the subject's capacity for reflection upon alternative social forms. An adequate account of this subversion requires the judicious use of psychodynamic concepts, especially those concerning defensively-oriented mental functioning.

The contradiction under investigation is internal to capitalist democracies and is continually manifested by worker suffering and discontent. To see this we only need refer to the history of labor-management conflict, an important source of which has been continuing resentment over the subordination of labor within a society in which an ethos of mutual respect and egalitarianism persists. This ethos should not be considered as a mere set of "values", but ideational-affective orientations interwoven with actual life-practices, clearly realized, for example, in voluntary organizations, certain facets of the legal system and general interpersonal

codes. As such, the contradiction represented by hierarchical and authoritarian practices of the factory should not be understood as simply a contradiction of values, and hence somewhat ephemeral and contingent, but of a set of needs and aspirations clashing with practices radically at odds with them. Thus, the suffering and discontent experienced by subordinates is unavoidable, given the nature of capitalist democracies.

Ideology is a mandated reinterpretation of such experience, one discouraging action directed at eliminating subordination of the sort associated with command hierarchies. In this regard ideology can be viewed as a framework of meaning in which the suffering is to be endured or, at its most potent, dedifferentiated as an experience. In other words, ideology operates as a metadiscourse reconciling two institutionalized, contradictory discourses, a reinterpretation of the two (or more) discourses in their relation to each other.

By mandated reinterpretation I refer to a process that involves more than a translation or a redefinition of the categories through which the contradictory experience is reflectively understood. This is because reinterpretation is carried out within a coercive power relationship. Rudimentarily, management wants to maintain control of the workplace; workers must sufficiently accomodate themselves to hierarchy so that they can make the required contribution to the work process or else they are fired. This general context of mandated reinterpretation does not remain "external" to the terms of the reinterpretation. By this I mean that even outside of the workplace the evocation and recall of life within the contradiction tends to carry with it a sense of the power relationships involved. Far from simply being acknowledged as "obstacles" to alternatives, power relationships assert themselves in the midst of the individual's

attempt to formulate their needs and associated frustrations. As we shall see, this form of influence is often not recognized by the subject; to grasp this side of the ideological process, we are obliged to employ psychoanalytically-informed categories and procedures.

The following interview sections are from the first and fourth of eight interviews done in 1978 with Pat, a young Chrysler assembly worker. Within the sections we discover not the direct expression of an attitude or position regarding his life at work, but an instance of a characteristic dynamic process, wherein Pat's ability to represent his suffering is subverted. I will begin in the middle of a passage, about five minutes into the first interview, in which we talked about the pace of his work:

Pat: They have a rate set up...[denotes pause] you know for normal production and how many parts a person can run an hour, and if run over that...like the rate on my machine is 3189. If I hit 3189 two hours early I don't have to work anymore and if they make me work they have to pay me time and a half for and hours worked ...so I just quit when I hit production.

Interviewer: So you can work a varying number of hours per day?

P: Yeah, there's a lot of people who work like five hours a day, everyday.

I: You mean you can go in there and really work hard for five hours...

P: Yeah, and then you go sit in an air-conditioned cafeteria, or out in the sun.

I conveyed some surprise that people had to remain at the plant after they met their quota. Pat replied:

P: Yeah...it strikes me as funny but, I don't know, I suppose it's to keep down cheating and things like that 'cause a lot of people

would like to leave early...

I: Let me follow this up some. How would you cheat if they know you've done 3189?

P: They really can't tell because the parts I make don't really go directly to somebody. They sit in a bin and some one else puts parts on top of those so they couldn't tell if it was mine or theirs or somebody else's. My counter, I push the counter by hand, so...there's lots of jobs like that.

I asked him if he minded hanging around the plant after he's done his quota.

P: Not really. You know there's people always saying 'Boy, I wish we could leave after we got done', but they really can't bitch because they get paid for doing nothing...you know...I mean the work isn't really that hard. I mean, most places, if you hit the...like Ford's, if you hit the production you're on call even if you are done.

Deciding to see how he would assess a justification for leaving the plant upon reaching the quota, I referred to the time and motion studies by which output is nominally determined:

P: Yeah, well it's supposed to be no more than a normal pace, is how it reads, the contract...Yeah, it does sound reasonable, but... uh, yeah...I don't see why they don't work it that way...It's just the way it's been since I've been there.

I: I see.

P: Sounds, yeah, they're just confining people.

I: Hmm...

P: That's what they're doing...I don't think they like the system they have there, really.

I asked if people planned to finish early.

P: People do that with the remainder of their time...there's always a card game you can get into...I used to get done everyday but they raised my rate and I won't...I won't run it. I mean, you know it's inhumanly possible so I start slowing down.

To recapitulate: Pat first focuses on the possibility of getting off as much as two hours early. When I wonder about why people are kept at the plant Pat momentarily questions the policy, then considers management's standpoint, speculating about the cheating that would occur if people were allowed to leave. Not recognizing that people who would be inclined to cheat would probably do so even if only to sit in the cafeteria, Pat goes on to talk about the possibilities for cheating, starting off at a general level and then focusing upon how his own job situation offers him the possibility.

I then ask if he minds staying around the plant after he has finished. His "Not really. I'm not getting paid for it," again suggests an identification with management's perspective. Other workers complain about staying, but do not form arguments Pat needs to seriously address; he thus simply characterizes them as people who 'bitch'. He then goes on to implicitly claim that they have no reason to argue because the work "isn't really that hard", an absolute argument which he then relativizes through the reference to conditions at Ford. I then start to set up a counterargument, couching it in terms of time and motion studies. He picks up on the notion of contractual limits to work and begins to wonder whether management is 'confining people'. He decides they

are, but then immediately separates act and actor by claiming management doesn't like their own system. I would argue that this sets up the possibility of criticizing work without confronting management's responsibility. This, in turn, allows him to begin to articulate an ongoing problem, the fact that the production rate, which he had earlier suggested was low enough for him to quit early, is actually so high that it cannot be met, that it is, in an ironic and contradictory slip, "inhumanly possible."

In this passage we have seen how certain experiences - the "inhumanly possible" rate, the post-quota "confinement" - are not allowed to gain a status that make them relevant to the overall characterization of the social relations of the workplace. Instead, this experience, constituted through the clash of systems of representation - one geared to management perogative and the rights of property owners, the other based upon what we might call Pat's conception of "human rights" - is suppressed. The onset of a critical attitude, both fueled by his negative experiences and potentially serving as a vehicle for elaborating them, sets off a counter-acting process of self-disqualification in Pat that reflects, on one level, a fantasied confrontation with management that is bound up in the process of reflection. Ultimately, suppressed experiences do attain a certain salience, but essentially in a manner that is abstracted from the very social relations within which they are constituted in the first place - after all, management doesn't like their own system.

I posed the question of democracy at the beginning of the fourth interview by asking Pat what he thought was most important about it:

P: I think the freedom to do anything you want. That's about it, or the most important...

I: Could you expand on that?

P: It's just that, you know, in nondemocratic countries people are oppressed and aren't able to say what they feel whereas in this country you can. We can also go just about any where we want at any time, or just about anywhere, more places than any nondemocratic country. That's about all.

We continued to talk generally about democracies, Pat bringing up President Carter's failures, at first expressing frustration with Carter but then shifting the blame to more anonymous "politicans who line their pockets instead of serving the people". I then shifted into a discussion of workplace democracy by asking him how he would characterize the way things were run at the plant. He said it wasn't a democracy:

P: Far from it, I think. At Chrysler you mean? No, I mean you can voice your opinion to the union but the company can only hear so much. I mean if all the employees were for something and the company were against it the company would win unless everyone went out on strike for it. It seems close to the way democracy is running right now, you know, where people have to go to extremes to get their way, but I don't think it's run as a democracy, the company has the final say, really the major say. Employees can only gripe to a certain extent. Suppressed...

I: How do you feel about that?

P: Seems like that's the only way they could run the company and still make any money. I mean, if they let the employees decide everything they wanted to do they could probably decide not to work or work two days a week or something, so they have to...Company prides itself, well, it doesn't pride itself but their way of getting things done

is to be strict on the rules. That's the only way the company could run smoothly, because if a democracy was used in the company the employees would be voting on everything..bringing up their proposals on the way they want the company run.

I asked him why he thought the employees would work only two days a week:

P: 'Cause it seems like everyone there gets everything they want and still doesn' have enough...Bad example...People are never satisfied with what they have, they always want more...

Pat went on to speculate about the causes of the "crazy" behavior of other employees, wondering at their challenges to rules, at how they would "take things to the limit". I asked when he had first met people like that:

P: I suppose when I started working for Chrysler, you know, that's the first place I really noticed it workwise, you know, union companies in general. Chrysler was the first place I ever worked where they kind of pushed things to the limit.

I: And that struck you as crazy? Were there any other feelings that you had towards them at that time?

P: Yeah, well when I first noticed it when they were voting on a new contract and everyone seemed dissatisfied with what they had, you know, to me it sounded like a really good, a great contract. And I thought they were all crazy, that they were pretty greedy at that point.

Another recapitulation: Pat responds impulsively to my question about democracy - it is the freedom to do anything you want. This is toned down to the freedom to move anywhere you want, a more negative "freedom

from" formulation. This is couched in a reference to nondemocratic countries, another relativization that limits and controls the initial expansive impulse.

Discussion of democratizing work, despite Pat's grievances, leads to a "realistic" recognition of the company's power, and then an identification with their standpoint. This identification entails not only Pat's taking up the company's perspective concerning the aims of the enterprise, but also engaging in criticism of the other employees. In his criticism Pat attributes naturalized traits of craziness and greed to his coworkers, simultaneously declaring his own satisfaction with the contract. To Pat, his coworkers' inability to control their impulses necessitates the guidance of the company.

I want to emphasize here that naturalization, on one level representing a moment of a socially grounded ideology, also ties in with Pat's own defensively determined, and thus 'naturalized' and inflexibly one-sided, approach to regulating his impulses. This tends to achieve an interpenetration and a mutually reinforcing mediation of both levels. The ideological statements are thereby transformed from simple propositions about the social order to a truth that the subject "feels" and "lives out". His defensive operations are thereby transformed from private maneuvers into "schemas" that frame a social "reality" that can be taken for granted. Finally, because coercion asserts itself unconsciously via defense, Pat can believe that he freely believes, thereby fulfilling the socially established requirement of free assent that justifies his granting of legitimacy to management control.

To sum up, the coercive environment of the plant and, more generally, class relations works to mobilize Pat's defenses as part of an effort at

"self-management". From the store of available ideological rationales Pat can select those that seem right, in part because they are compatible with private meanings bound up in defensive processes. Within this coerced process, ideology becomes "defense syntonic" and defenses, "ideology syntonic". Conflicts formed within contradictions are caught up in forms of thinking charged not only with concern about the likely consequences of opposition and difficulties of adjustment, but also with ill-defined anxiety that the subject, if they recognize it at all, finds hard to address and allay. Proposals for alternative social forms, entailing revision of intra- and interpersonal relations, are more likely to seem impossible, absurd, and frightening, and thus the appraisal of "objective" obstacles are made more difficult. To be sure, further discussion with Pat might have succeeded in relaxing barriers to the consideration of discontent. But this generally does not occur; the individual's "certainty" is left undisturbed as social criticism is caught up in the dialectic of defense and social coercion.

Finally, I would emphasize the implications for standard survey research approaches to the study of attitudes regarding primary social relations. To the extent surveys propose to gauge mass interests and desires regarding such relations, forms of questioning that assume a monochromatic, resolved quality to "opinion" will be inadequate. Instead, they will succeed in supporting processes of misrepresentation. Such conventional research can only facilitate the ideological project, conceal social problems, and obscure the nexus of personality and ideology outlined here.